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There is by now a large literature that describes and discusses discontent with the 
process of pro-market reforms that is usually subsumed under the heading of the 
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson, 1990) and often associated with the 
process of “globalization” (for a survey see Lora and Panizza, 2003, and Stiglitz, 
2002). The objective of this paper is to use opinion polls to document Latin 
Americans’ increasing discontent with reforms and to explore possible 
explanations for this trend. We test four possible explanations for the rejection of 
reforms. The first focuses on a change in political orientation. The second focuses 
on a change in political activism on the part of those who oppose reforms. The 
third focuses on trust in political actors. The fourth focuses on the economic 
situation. There is also an important set of explanations for the rejection of 
reforms that we do not consider in this paper. This set of explanation focuses on 
the role of cognitive biases in the formation of public opinion. A very interesting 
paper by Pernice and Sturzenegger (2003) studies the case of Argentina and uses 
cognitive bias (especially confirmatory and self-serving biases) to explain 
rejection of reforms.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes some indicators 
aimed at measuring support for pro-market reforms and describes their evolution 
over time. It also describes the demographics of those who support and oppose 
reforms. Section 2 explores possible explanations for discontent with the reform 
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1.  What Do Latin American Think of Reforms 
 
The purpose of this section is to gauge the attitude of Latin Americans towards pro-market 
reforms. In order to do so, we use individual-level data from the Latinobarómetro annual 
surveys. This dataset covers 17 Latin American countries over a period of eight years (1995, 
1996, 1997, and 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003) and consists of an average of 1,200 
respondents per country-year.
1 Even though the sampling method varies slightly from country to 
country, as implementation is contracted out to national polling firms, in most cases the selection 
includes some quotas to ensure representation across gender, socio-economic status, and age.  
Although the Latinobarómetro data offer an unprecedented wealth of information, there 
are some problems with the survey.  First of all, as Latinobarómetro focuses on urban 
populations, it prevents us from exploring the opinions of residents of rural areas. Second, as the 
surveys are conducted using the country’s official language (Spanish or Portuguese), they are not 
representative of those portions of the indigenous population that are not fluent in the official 
language.  Moreover, there is some evidence that, at least in the early years, the pool of survey 
respondents overrepresented individuals with relatively high levels of education (Gaviria, 
Panizza, Seddon and Stein, 2000).  
  We build several indicators to measure attitudes toward reforms. The first set of variables 
measures the general attitude toward a market economy. PRIVATIZATION (available for 1998, 
2000, 2001, and 2003) takes a value of one if the respondent thinks that the privatization process 
was beneficial for the country and zero otherwise. MARKET (available for 1998, 2000, and 
2003) takes a value of one if the respondent thinks that a market economy is good for the country 
and zero otherwise. PRICES (available from 1998, 2000, and 2001) takes a value of one if the 
respondent thinks that prices should be set by the market and zero if he/she thinks that prices 
should be decided by some central authority. PRIVPROD (available for 1998 and 2001) takes a 
value of one if the respondent thinks that productive activity should be left to the private sector 
and zero otherwise. 
The second set of indicators deals with attitudes towards international trade and foreign 
direct investment. In particular, LACINT (available for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2001) is a 
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dichotomous variable that takes a value of one if the respondent holds a favorable view of 
economic integration in Latin America and a value of zero if the respondent is against the 
integration process. FDI (available for 1998 only) takes a value of one if the respondent thinks 
that foreign direct investment is beneficial for the country and zero if he/she thinks that foreign 
direct investment is harmful.  
Table 1 summarizes the average values of the six variables mentioned above.
2 The most 
striking fact is the large drop in support for reforms. In 1998 more than 50 percent of Latin 
Americans thought that privatization was beneficial for their country. This percentage dropped to 
31 percent in 2001 and 25 percent in 2003.  In 1998, 77 percent of Latin Americans thought that 
a market economy was good for the country. In 2003, the percentage supporting a market 
economy dropped to 18 percent.
3 Support for private production and market prices also dropped, 
but by a smaller amount, and there was no change in support for economic integration in Latin 
America. 
It is however misleading to talk of Latin America as a homogenous entity. Figures 1 and 
2 show that there are large cross-country differences in support for reforms.  Figure 1 shows that 
support for privatization in 2003 ranged from 37 percent (in Brazil) to just above 10 percent (in 
Argentina and Panama). Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Paraguay are 
the countries where support for privatization dropped by the largest amount.  Figure 2 shows a 
similar negative trend in the decline of support for a market economy. 
Before moving on and attempting to explain this drop in support for reforms, it is 
interesting to look at the demographics of those who support and oppose reforms.  We do so by 
running a set of regressions where the dependent variables are the different indicators we are 
using to measure attitude toward reforms and the explanatory variables include a set of socio-
economic variables that include respondents’ age, sex, education, wealth and economic situation 
(Table 2). To make the results more intuitive, the regressions were estimated using a linear 
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significant, is also rather low, indicating that different questions do in fact capture different aspects of attitudes 
towards pro-market reforms. 
3 This may be partly due to the fact that there was a slight change in the question. Latinobarómetro surveys from 
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probability model
4 and all of the regressions include country fixed effects and country-specific 
time effects.   
In all cases, we find that men tend to be more supportive of pro-market reforms than 
women (the difference ranges between one and five percentage points, as shown in Figure 3). 
We also find that support for economic integration increases with education (an individual who 
belongs to the top quintile of the wealth distribution and who holds a university degree is 20 
percentage points more likely to support economic integration than an individual who belongs to 
the bottom quintile and has no education). This is an interesting finding, because according to 
standard trade theory it is the relatively abundant factor of production (unskilled labor in the case 
of Latin America) that is likely to benefit the most from economic integration.  
We also find that wealth is only weakly correlated with support for economic integration 
and education is weakly correlated with support for privatization and the free market in general 
(Figures 4 and 5).  
 
2.  Reasons for Discontent 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the possible reasons for the discontent with the reforms 
process.  We analyze four possible explanations: (i) an overall movement of the population to the 
left; (ii) an increase in the political activism of those who oppose reforms; (iii) a decrease in trust 
for political actors; and (iv) the economic crisis. 
 
2.1   Have Latin Americans Moved to the Left?  
 
One possible cause for the decrease in support for pro-market reforms might be an overall 
movement of the Latin American population towards the left. This could be part of a global trend 
with the end of the Reagan-Thatcher era and the beginning of a new worldwide movement 
towards the left following, with a lag, the leadership of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.   
Latinobarómetro allows us to investigate this hypothesis because it includes a question 
on the respondent’s political orientation. In particular, the survey asks: “On a scale of 0 to 10 
how right wing are you?” (0 being the most left wing and 10 the most right wing). The last 
column of Table 1 reports the average values for the answer to this question, and Figure 6 shows 
the data for 1996, 1998, 2001, and 2003. The data suggest that there was no net change in 
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political orientation and, if anything, they show a small movement towards the right. We also 
look at the behavior of extremists. Table 3 reports the share of people that define themselves as 
being extremist, either right wing or left wing.
5 The table shows that most Central American and 
Andean countries are characterized by a large share of right-wing extremists. Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela, and Brazil appear to be the most polarized countries, with a large share of 
the population defining themselves as either right-wing or left-wing extremist. Argentina, 
Bolivia, and Chile are the countries with the smallest share of extremists. These cross-country 
differences could be due that the definition of being right wing is country-specific.
6 What is 
interesting from the table and from Figure 6, however, is the relative stability of political 
opinion, providing prima facie evidence that Latin Americans did not move towards the left. 
Next, we augment the regressions of Table 2 with a variable that measures political 
orientation (Table 3).  We find that those who describes themselves as being just to the right of 
center tend to be more supportive of pro-market reforms than those who describe themselves as 
being left of center or to either extreme of the political spectrum. Among people at the extremes, 
we find that those at the extreme right are generally more supportive of reforms than those at the 
extreme left (Figure 7).  This weak correlation between opposite political extremism and support 
for reforms, together with the fact that political orientation has been stable over the period under 
observation, leads us to the conclusion that there is no evidence for a link between rejection of 
reforms and a movement of the population towards the left.  
In the regressions of Table 3, we also control for three variables that check whether the 
respondent feels that: (i) elections are clean; (ii) success in life is due to hard work rather than to 
connections; and (iii) corruption is an important problem.  We find a positive correlation 
between the perceived fairness of the political system and support for reform. Those who think 
that elections are clean are between 3 and 8 percentage points more likely to be in favor of 
economic integration and privatization.  This is an important finding because it may mean that a 
clean and well-functioning democratic system could make the reform process more sustainable.
7 
                                                       
5 Left-wing extremists are defined as those who choose values 0 or 1 to the question how right wing are you and 
right-wing extremists are defined as those who answered to the same question with 9 or 10. 
6 For instance, it is commonly thought that those who classify themselves as being liberal (i.e., left wing) in the U.S. 
often have political ideas that would classify them as centrist in most European countries.   
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We also find that those who think that hard work is more important than connections tend to be 
more supportive of reforms. 
Interestingly, we find that those who perceive that corruption is a serious problem are 
more in favor of economic openness (e.g., they support economic integration and think that 
foreign direct investment, or FDI, is beneficial for the country); this supports the finding of Ades 
and Di Tella (1999), who show that openness can help in reducing corruption. At the same time, 
those who think that corruption is a serious problem tend to be more skeptical of the privatization 
process and the working of the market economy. This is in line with the findings of Lora and 
Panizza (2003), who find that privatization works better in countries characterized by low levels 
of corruption. 
 
2.2   Those Who Oppose Reforms Have Become More Vocal 
 
Another possible explanation for the rejection of reforms could be that, following the worldwide 
resonance of the anti-globalization protest during the WTO meetings in Seattle and of events like 
the World Social Forum, those who oppose reforms have become more vocal and thus have been 
able to better promote their cause among the general population.  Next, we check whether there 
are differences in political participation between those who support and those who oppose 
reforms. In order to test this hypothesis, we run a set of regressions where the dependent variable 
measures whether an individual is interested in politics or not (measured by the question “Are 
you interested in politics?” (Possible answers range from 1 to 4, with 1 representing little or no 
interest and 4 a high level of interest.)  
In general, we find that those who support reforms are more interested in politics than 
those who oppose reforms (figure 7). Even though this is not surprising, because there is a 
positive correlation between interest in politics and education (and thus a positive correlation 
between education and support for reforms), it should be noticed that the positive correlation 
between support for reforms and interest in politics is rather weak. 
Next, we move beyond pure interest in politics and build an index of violent political 
activities.
8  Figure 8 shows that those who oppose reforms are between 1 and 2.5 percentage 
points (corresponding to a 10 percent difference) more likely to participate in violent political 
activities. While this finding lends support to the idea that those who oppose reforms tend to   9
“make more noise” than those who support reforms, it should be recognized that the difference is 
rather small.  We also checked whether the correlation between attitude toward reforms and 
participation in violent political activities has been changing over time. In particular, we checked 
whether those who are against reforms have become more active in recent years, but we did not 
find any evidence in support of this idea. 
 
2.3  People Have Less Trust in Public Institutions and Political Parties 
 
Another possible explanation for the discontent toward reforms in Latin America has to do with 
the fact that people stopped trusting political parties and/or the elites that promoted the reforms 
process. Scholars of economic development suggest that political parties may be important in the 
reform process because of their programmatic orientation and because they may facilitate the 
process of aggregating disparate views and arriving at compromises for the adoption of reforms 
(Boix and Posner, 1998, cited in Corrales, 2002, and Graham et al., 1999). Moreover, political 
parties may also play an important role in the sustainability of reforms, because they can shield 
reforms from interest group pressures. Reforms are therefore more susceptible to losing the 
support of public opinion in countries where confidence in political parties is low.  
Of course, if we were to find any support for this hypothesis, then we would have the 
difficult task of explaining why trust in political parties has decreased over time.  It is 
nonetheless interesting, though, to look at whether there is a relationship between support for 
reforms and trust in political parties.  We measure trust in and identification with political parties 
by using two different variables. The first, CONFIPP (available for 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 
2001, and 2003) measures the level of trust in political parties, taking a value of 4 if the 
respondent has a great deal of trust in political parties and 1 if the respondent does not trust 
political parties. The second, IDENTPP (available for 1996, 1997 and 2003) measures 
respondents’ identification with political parties, with values ranging from 1 if the respondent 
feels little or no identification with political parties to 4 if the respondent feels very identified 
with political parties. The first two columns of Table 5 summarize the data and show a small 
decline in trust in political parties (from 1.8 in 1998 to 1.5 in 2003). Table 6 shows that there is a 
strong and positive correlation between support for reforms and trust in political parties. The 
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results indicate that an individual who fully trusts political parties is 14 percentage points more 
likely to support a market economy than an individual who does not trust political parties (and 20 
percentage points more likely to support privatization).  However, when we multiply the 
coefficient obtained in column 7 of Table 6 with the change in trust of political parties, we obtain 
a value of half a percentage point, indicating that changes in support for political parties can only 
explain a minuscule share of the change in support for privatization (which dropped by almost 30 
percentage points). 
The last two columns of Table 5 look at the evolution of trust in the national congress 
(TR_CON) and trust in the president (TR_PRE). As in the case of support for political parties, 
we find that support for the president or the executive has somewhat declined, but not enough to 
explain the drop in support of reforms. In particular, Table 7 (column 3) shows that those who 
trust the president tend to be more supportive of the market economy, but by multiplying the 
coefficient (0.05) of the change in support for the president over the 1998-2003 period (0.23) we 
obtain 0.012. This implies that change in support for the president can explain a 1 percent drop in 
support for the market economy. Over the same period of time, support for the market economy 
dropped by approximately 60 percentage points. Again, this indicates that the finding that people 
who trust the President or the Congress tend to be more supportive of reforms does not help us in 
explaining discontent with reforms. 
 
2.4   Is it the Economy? 
 
The last set of explanations can be summarized with the famous sentence: “It’s the economy, 
stupid!”  
Table 8 summarizes the recent behavior of four macroeconomic variables: (i) the output 
gap (computed as the log deviation of actual GDP from trend GDP);
9 (ii) the unemployment rate; 
(iii) adjusted inflation (computed as 1-1/1+π)); and (iv) the depth of economic crisis (obtained by 
multiplying GDP gap by minus one and setting economic expansion equal to zero).  Table 8 
shows that the macroeconomic situation deteriorated on all fronts with the exception of inflation.  
The GDP gap went from positive to negative, average unemployment increased by 2.5 
percentage points, and economic crises became deeper and more prevalent.  
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period.   11
  Table 9 looks at how macroeconomic variables affect attitude towards reforms. As 
dependent variables, we use attitude towards privatization and attitude towards the market 
economy. Besides the standard set of control variables used in Table 2,
 we now include the four 
macroeconomic variables of Table 8 lagged one year.
10 All the estimated coefficients have the 
expected sign (positive for output gap and negative for the other variables), with the exception of 
inflation, which enters into the regression with a positive sign (statistically significant when 
unemployment, inflation and output gap are entered in the same regression). Interestingly, 
unemployment is not statistically significant when all the macro variables are entered in the same 
regression.   
  Our results suggest that some macroeconomic variables play an important role in 
explaining attitude towards reforms. For instance, if we look at the relationship between the 
output gap and the support for privatization during the 1998-2003 period, we can see that support 
for privatization went from 52 to 25 percent. The average output gap was 3 percent in 1997, and 
–3 percent in 2002 (a change of 6 percentage points). By multiplying 6 by the estimated 
coefficient (0.012), we obtain 0.072, which is close to one third of the total drop in support for 
reforms.  The case of Argentina is a striking example of the importance of macroeconomic 
factors. In this country, the output gap went from 7 percent in 1997 to –14 percent in 2002. This 
alone explains a drop in support for privatization equivalent to 25 percentage points, which is 
about 80 percent of the observed drop in support for privatization in Argentina (which fell from 
45 to 13 percent). It should be noted that what we are finding here is somewhat in contrast with 
the findings of Pernice and Sturzenegger (2003), who suggest that, in the case of Argentina, 
opposition to the economic program of the government started picking up when the economy 
was still growing at a fast rate. However, if one focuses on unemployment instead of GDP 
growth we find a stronger negative correlation between support for the government’s economic 
plan and unemployment. 
  There is in fact evidence that a large share of Latin Americans tend to blame 
globalization (or one of its two main forces, the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organization) for the recent economic crisis (Table 10). Feelings against globalization are 
particularly strong in El Salvador and Panama. At the same time, more than 20 percent of 
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Argentineans, Bolivians, Hondurans and Uruguayans think that the International Monetary Fund 
is responsible for the economic crisis. The case of Argentina is particularly interesting, because 
few residents of this country seem to be opposed to globalization or to the WTO, but more than 
one quarter of the population is opposed to IMF policies. Overall, there are six Latin American 
countries where more than 40 percent of the population blames globalization (or one of its two 
main actors) for the economic crisis.  
A majority of Latin Americans also blame their own government for the economic crisis. 
Criticism of the government is particularly strong in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay and 
Uruguay.  There are only three countries (Chile, Colombia and Mexico) where more than 2 
percent of the population does not blame anybody for the economic situation.  
Thus, as Table 10 shows that Latin Americans associate the reform process with the 
economic crisis, it corroborates the idea that the difficult economic situation is responsible for 
the rejection of pro-market reforms.  
 
3.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we use opinion polls data to document discontent with pro-market reforms among 
Latin Americans and test several theories aimed at explaining this discontent. We find support 
for the simplest and most intuitive theory. The backlash against reforms is mostly explained by 
the recent collapse in economic activity. So, in the words of the 1992 Clinton campaign, “It’s the 
economy, stupid!”  
  The implications of this finding may vary greatly, depending on the causes of the recent 
economic crisis. If the crises were indeed due to the fact that the reform process increased 
volatility and contributed to economic instability (as some opponents of reforms think), then 
those who oppose reforms are right and the change in opinion registered by the survey is a 
healthy phenomenon in which citizens reject something that did not work. However, if the crises 
were mostly due by external shocks and international contagion, then those who oppose reforms 
would make the mistake of giving a causal interpretation to a spurious correlation.  
  There is, in fact, some evidence, that this may be the case. Birdsall and de la Torre (2001) 
suggest that, while not fully successful, the process of structural reforms played a positive role in 
limiting the damaging effect of the large external shock that hit Latin America in the late 1990s.    13
  The disillusionment with reforms may also be due to excessive expectations. 
Policymakers may have made the mistake of overselling the reforms (by promising too much), 
and the disillusionment with reforms documented in this paper could be due to unmet 
expectations. In fact, it is interesting that a similar rejection of reforms is now happening in some 
East European countries that, over the last decade, displayed excellent growth performance (The 
Economist, September 11, 2003).    14
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Table 1.: What do Latin Americans Think of Pro-Market Reforms? 
 LACINT  FDI  PRIVATIZ.  MARKET  PRICES  PRIVPROD  RIGHTWING 
1996  0.74         5.33 
1997  0.87         5.53 
1998  0.88 0.77  0.52 0.77 0.63  0.56 5.58 
2000      0.38 0.67 0.57    5.33 
2001  0.84   0.31   0.59  0.50 5.87 
2003      0.25 0.18     5.52 
 
Table 2. Attitude towards Reform and Socio-Economic Characteristics 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 LACINT  FDI  PRIVATIZATION  MARKET  PRICES  PRIVPROD 
AGE  0.032  0.045  -0.355  -0.120 -0.057 0.428 
  (0.62)  (0.33) (5.63)***  (1.77)*  (0.72) (4.31)*** 
AGE2  0.000  -0.001  0.003  0.001 0.001 -0.004 
  (0.04)  (0.39) (4.40)***  (1.55) (1.16) (3.24)*** 
SEX  -1.243  -5.486 -1.749  -2.088 -3.973 -4.140 
  (4.02)***  (6.80)*** (4.69)***  (5.18)*** (8.64)*** (7.02)*** 
quintile==2  1.851  3.350  -0.815  -0.030 -0.052 -0.453 
  (3.53)***  (2.56)**  (1.31)  (0.04) (0.07) (0.46) 
quintile==3  3.502  4.669 -0.138  0.877 2.143 0.522 
  (6.36)***  (3.37)*** (0.21)  (1.25)  (2.65)*** (0.50) 
quintile==4  3.859  7.957 0.617  0.337 3.132 1.925 
  (6.68)***  (5.53)*** (0.89)  (0.45)  (3.70)*** (1.76)* 
quintile==5  4.691  11.077  4.521  1.981 5.838 5.498 
  (7.33)***  (6.80)*** (5.83)***  (2.39)**  (6.18)*** (4.47)*** 
EDUCA==2  1.505  1.459 -2.511  0.027 1.945 -0.303 
  (1.65)* (0.52) (2.55)**  (0.02) (1.52) (0.19) 
EDUCA==3  3.210  4.775 -3.541  -1.283  2.012 -1.278 
  (3.55)***  (1.72)*  (3.60)***  (1.19) (1.57) (0.79) 
EDUCA==4  4.549  5.915 -4.551  -0.604  2.290 -1.241 
 (5.07)***  (2.14)**  (4.59)***  (0.55)  (1.81)*  (0.77) 
EDUCA==5  5.255  7.948 -3.320  -0.106  3.199 -1.758 
 (5.92)***  (2.90)***  (3.35)***  (0.10)  (2.54)**  (1.10) 
EDUCA==6  7.524  8.764 -2.552  -2.284  2.272 -2.082 
 (7.75)***  (2.98)***  (2.30)**  (1.88)*  (1.63)  (1.16) 
EDUCA==7 7.336  11.113  1.222  -0.598  3.653  1.448 
  (7.52)***  (3.76)*** (1.08)  (0.49)  (2.58)*** (0.78) 
SOC_EC==1  1.240  1.806  -0.640  -0.790 -1.468 0.116 
  (1.22)  (0.70) (0.57)  (0.67) (1.00) (0.06) 
SOC_EC==2  2.302  0.901 -0.152  0.694 -0.801  -1.851 
  (2.37)**  (0.36) (0.14)  (0.59) (0.55) (0.98) 
SOC_EC==3  3.638  0.244 1.063  2.371 0.191 -1.153 
  (3.59)***  (0.09) (0.90)  (1.91)*  (0.13) (0.58) 
SOC_EC==4  4.503  3.727 4.536  4.015 2.807 2.791 
  (3.95)***  (1.24) (3.31)***  (2.82)***  (1.62) (1.22) 
Constant 77.147  58.929  25.636  70.298 68.660 44.428 
  (37.64)***  (12.35)*** (10.96)***  (28.49)*** (24.11)*** (12.87)*** 
Observations  55192  11534 60813  43815 44187 28062 
R-squared 0.07  0.06  0.08  0.30 0.04 0.04 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3. Share of Extremists 
  1996  1997  1998 2000 2001 2003 TOTAL 
  LEFT RIGHT  LEFT  RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT LEFT RIGHT 
ARG  0.03 0.09  0.04  0.08  0.05 0.19  0.02 0.13  0.03 0.11  0.04 0.09  0.04 0.11 
BOL 0.09 0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09 0.09  0.12 0.05  0.09 0.10  0.12 0.11  0.10 0.09 
BRA 0.15 0.17  0.10  0.07  0.17 0.18  0.13 0.15  0.15 0.25  0.15 0.22  0.14 0.18 
CHI 0.08 0.08  0.07  0.07  0.07 0.08  0.08 0.10  0.08 0.12  0.07 0.14  0.08 0.10 
COL 0.06 0.17  0.03  0.22  0.18 0.20  0.07 0.15  0.06 0.28  0.11 0.28  0.08 0.21 
CRI  0.11 0.16  0.06  0.19  0.18 0.25  0.07 0.32  0.07 0.36  0.15 0.23  0.10 0.25 
ECU 0.14 0.20  0.12  0.20  0.14 0.21  0.11 0.21  0.14 0.19  0.08 0.19  0.12 0.20 
ELS 0.12 0.14  0.11  0.16  0.10 0.21  0.08 0.12  0.14 0.38  0.18 0.30  0.12 0.22 
GTM  0.13 0.08  0.23  0.08  0.15 0.23  0.11 0.12  0.08 0.18  0.15 0.34  0.14 0.17 
HON 0.06  0.36  0.05  0.47  0.09 0.46  0.08 0.17  0.05 0.62 0.11  0.40 0.07  0.42 
MEX  0.21 0.18  0.04  0.09  0.12 0.18  0.06 0.11  0.05 0.08  0.14 0.14  0.11 0.12 
NIC 0.15 0.21  0.07  0.13  0.15 0.15  0.32 0.23  0.17 0.24  0.22 0.36  0.17 0.21 
PAN 0.28 0.09  0.17  0.21  0.01 0.43  0.09 0.20  0.14 0.26  0.16 0.15  0.15 0.21 
PER 0.04 0.13  0.04  0.13  0.08 0.14  0.05 0.09  0.06 0.12  0.08 0.12  0.05 0.12 
PRY 0.04 0.07  0.10  0.09  0.12 0.15  0.07 0.08  0.13 0.19  0.05 0.17  0.08 0.14 
URY  0.08 0.14  0.06  0.10  0.07 0.13  0.12 0.15  0.11 0.10  0.09 0.09  0.08 0.12 
VEN 0.12 0.34  0.11  0.22  0.16 0.21  0.13 0.20  0.12 0.30  0.14 0.32  0.13 0.26 
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Table 4. Attitude towards Reform, Socio-Economic Characteristics,  
and Political Preferences 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 LACINT  FDI  PRIVATIZATION  MARKET  PRICES  PRIVPROD 
AGE -0.003  -0.002  -0.245  -0.134  -0.099  0.476 
 (0.04)  (0.01)  (2.13)**  (1.21)  (0.85)  (2.64)*** 
AGE2 0.000  -0.000  0.002  0.002  0.002  -0.004 
 (0.21)  (0.14)  (1.69)*  (1.34)  (1.38)  (1.84)* 
SEX -0.989  -4.885  -0.765  -1.484  -3.314  -3.487 
 (2.09)**  (5.10)***  (1.14)  (2.30)** (4.91)***  (3.23)*** 
quintile==2 0.914  1.935  0.789  -1.408  -0.202  0.417 
 (1.12)  (1.22)  (0.70)  (1.29)  (0.18)  (0.23) 
quintile==3 1.699  4.464  2.395  1.224  1.758  1.849 
 (2.01)**  (2.66)***  (2.03)**  (1.08)  (1.48)  (0.98) 
quintile==4 1.960  7.243  4.517  1.288  3.636  3.419 
 (2.22)**  (4.15)***  (3.67)*** (1.09)  (2.94)***  (1.74)* 
quintile==5 2.021  10.372  10.145  3.800  7.088  10.250 
 (2.06)**  (5.33)***  (7.46)***  (2.92)***  (5.20)***  (4.69)*** 
EDUCA==2 1.578  4.036  -0.305  4.673  0.135  -1.108 
 (1.00)  (1.20)  (0.14)  (2.24)**  (0.06)  (0.29) 
EDUCA==3 2.958  7.785  -0.828  4.451  1.471  -0.088 
 (1.91)*  (2.32)**  (0.38)  (2.15)**  (0.67)  (0.02) 
EDUCA==4 4.386  7.154  -1.602  5.765  2.403  2.218 
 (2.88)***  (2.15)**  (0.75)  (2.85)***  (1.13)  (0.59) 
EDUCA==5 5.792  9.155  -0.290  6.466  3.952  1.969 
 (3.85)***  (2.78)***  (0.14) (3.21)***  (1.86)*  (0.53) 
EDUCA==6 7.605  10.584  -0.731  3.014  1.782  1.877 
 (4.68)***  (3.00)***  (0.32)  (1.40)  (0.78)  (0.47) 
EDUCA==7 7.192  13.468  3.086  4.963  3.698  2.264 
 (4.46)***  (3.81)***  (1.37)  (2.31)**  (1.63)  (0.57) 
SOC_EC==1 3.695  0.958  1.012  0.376  -1.338  3.071 
 (2.06)**  (0.30)  (0.45)  (0.17)  (0.59)  (0.85) 
SOC_EC==2 3.306  1.787  1.309  1.873  -0.285  -2.309 
 (1.89)*  (0.58)  (0.60)  (0.89)  (0.13)  (0.65) 
SOC_EC==3 4.821  0.366  2.463  2.999  1.623  -1.609 
 (2.67)***  (0.11)  (1.08)  (1.37)  (0.70)  (0.44) 
SOC_EC==4 5.497  4.321  7.303  4.262  3.484  3.568 
 (2.79)***  (1.19)  (2.86)***  (1.74)*  (1.35)  (0.87) 
RIGHTWING==1 1.397  -0.470  -2.300  -2.386 1.704  3.285 
 (0.85)  (0.15)  (1.07)  (1.16)  (0.79)  (0.91) 
RIGHTWING==2 2.551  -5.379  -2.577  -2.842 1.424  -0.315 
 (1.66)*  (1.85)*  (1.21)  (1.39)  (0.67)  (0.10) 
RIGHTWING==3 3.074  0.973  1.413  -1.087 4.146  6.357 
 (2.29)**  (0.38)  (0.76)  (0.61)  (2.22)**  (2.21)** 
RIGHTWING==4 3.930  -0.695  1.653  -0.288 5.423  3.703 
 (2.96)***  (0.27)  (0.89)  (0.16)  (2.93)***  (1.28) 
RIGHTWING==5 4.513  2.874  3.294  2.902  5.773  4.983 
 (4.09)***  (1.46)  (2.14)**  (1.99)** (3.76)***  (2.22)** 
RIGHTWING==6 5.268  2.677  7.875  5.977  9.790  9.521 
 (4.03)***  (1.07)  (4.18)***  (3.33)***  (5.19)***  (3.35)*** 
RIGHTWING==7 3.817  6.530  11.380  8.223  10.463  11.116 
 (2.90)***  (2.59)***  (5.99)***  (4.53)*** (5.51)*** (3.87)*** 
RIGHTWING==8 3.605  3.122  8.279  6.671  8.043  6.022 
 (2.79)***  (1.28)  (4.44)***  (3.74)***  (4.31)***  (2.18)** 
RIGHTWING==9 1.724  -2.256  5.096  3.338  3.222  7.796 
 (1.15)  (0.71)  (2.34)**  (1.61)  (1.48)  (2.18)** 
RIGHTWING==10 3.176  -0.447 6.590  6.059  6.887  0.002 
 (2.60)***  (0.21)  (3.86)***  (3.73)*** (4.03)*** (0.00) 
Elections are clean  4.078  7.447  6.184  3.637  4.751  3.557 
 (7.72)***  (7.11)***  (8.41)***  (5.16)*** (6.44)*** (3.01)*** 
Connections are imp.  0.812  -0.054  0.037  1.428  0.898  3.533 
 (2.27)**  (0.08)  (0.07)  (3.00)*** (1.80)*  (4.44)*** 
Corruption is a prob.  3.811  2.896  -2.541  0.120  -2.187  -3.067 
 (9.38)***  (3.59)***  (4.11)***  (0.20)  (3.53)***  (3.41)*** 
Constant 67.326  43.855  28.626 53.717  61.887  46.390 
 (19.79)***  (6.81)***  (6.08)***  (11.79)*** (13.03)*** (6.36)*** 
Observations  19077  8157 20546  19411 20328 8271 
R-squared 0.05  0.08  0.08  0.05  0.05  0.05 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             











1996  1.87 1.66 2.96       2.96    
1997  2.04 1.75 2.78     2.70    
1998  1.84   2.98      2.77    
2000  1.77   3.01     2.75    
2001  1.78   3.08     2.96    
2003  1.50 1.55 3.32     3.01    
 
(a) a higher value means more trust or more identification  






Table 6. Support for Reforms and Confidence 
and Identification with Political Parties 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
 LACINT  LACINT  MARKET MARKET PRICES  PRIVATIZ.  PRIVATIZ. 
IDENTPP  0.010   0.035     0.021  
  (3.90)***   (9.70)***     (5.02)***  
CONFPP   0.013   0.034  0.023   0.053 
   (7.33)***   (14.19)***  (8.71)***   (23.49)*** 
Constant 0.865 0.856  0.111 0.602 0.636 0.100 0.053 
  (65.68)*** (70.45)***  (9.04)***  (40.73)*** (40.40)*** (7.20)***  (3.76)*** 
Observations  28587 59409  17153 46784 47231 15545 63552 
R-squared  0.08 0.07  0.03 0.31 0.04 0.03 0.09 
   Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses             
   *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 




Table 7. Support for Reforms and Trust in Congress and President 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  LACINT  LACINT  MARKET MARKET PRICES  PRICES 
TR_PRE  -0.027   -0.050   -0.033   
  (16.92)***   (24.29)***   (13.81)***   
TR_CON    -0.018   -0.040   -0.027 
    (10.62)***   (17.90)***   (10.71)*** 
Constant 0.961  0.933  0.861 0.833 0.897 0.753 
 (75.14)***  (72.59)***  (56.12)***  (52.66)*** (53.34)*** (44.18)*** 
Observations  59626  59081 46911 46368 47429 46928 
R-squared  0.07  0.07 0.31 0.31 0.04 0.04 
     Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       





Table 8. Macroeconomic Variables 
  GDP GAP  Unemployment  Inflation  Depth of Crisis 
  Average  SD Average  SD Average  SD Average  SD 
1994 2.04  1.99  7.49  2.68  0.27 0.27 0.07 0.17 
1995 1.21  2.99  8.62  3.98  0.17 0.11 0.70 1.62 
1996 1.37  2.42  9.64  4.10  0.15 0.11 0.46 1.08 
1997 3.16  2.76  8.97  3.60  0.12 0.09 0.14 0.43 
1999 0.37  3.27  10.38  4.45  0.08 0.09 1.26 1.84 
2000 0.44  2.59  10.02  4.64  0.09 0.11 0.83 1.44 
2002 -3.35  5.04  10.76  4.25  0.07 0.06 3.90 4.27 
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Table 9. Macroeconomic Factors and Support for Reforms 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
  Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Privatization Market  Market  Market  Market  Market 
                
GDP Gap  0.012     0.014  0.032        0.040 
  (5.36)***     (2.72)***  (5.22)***        (3.08)*** 
Unemployment    -0.023    -0.000    -0.050      0.022 
   (3.01)***    (0.01)    (2.16)**      (0.62) 
Inflation    0.416   0.585      1.826    2.146 
    (1.35)   (4.18)***      (1.35)    (3.01)*** 
                
Depth of Crisis     -0.016         -0.048   
     (4.63)***         (4.66)***   
AGE  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000  -0.001  -0.001 -0.000 
  (2.87)*** (2.33)**  (3.00)*** (2.91)*** (2.35)**  (1.58) (1.22)  (1.94)*  (1.62) (1.17) 
SEX  -0.015 -0.017 -0.016 -0.015 -0.017 -0.017 -0.022  -0.021  -0.018 -0.018 
  (2.78)*** (2.89)*** (2.78)*** (2.78)*** (2.86)*** (3.28)*** (3.96)***  (3.71)***  (3.53)*** (3.07)*** 
quintile==2  -0.008 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 0.001  0.005  0.004  0.002  0.006 
  (1.06) (0.30) (0.99) (1.03) (0.24) (0.12) (0.53)  (0.44)  (0.21) (0.65) 
quintile==3  0.003 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.016 0.018  0.014  0.015 0.021 
  (0.27) (1.12) (0.16) (0.25) (1.29) (1.61) (1.85)*  (1.47)  (1.58) (2.14)** 
quintile==4  0.020 0.029 0.020 0.020 0.029 0.023 0.032  0.030  0.024 0.030 
  (1.80)* (2.94)***  (1.79)* (1.82)* (2.97)***  (2.26)** (3.38)***  (2.86)***  (2.25)** (3.47)*** 
quintile==5  0.079 0.089 0.078 0.079 0.090 0.039 0.052  0.043  0.039 0.050 
  (4.84)*** (5.56)*** (4.78)*** (4.84)*** (5.66)*** (2.69)*** (3.56)***  (3.00)***  (2.67)*** (3.83)*** 
Constant  0.398 0.622 0.364 0.425 0.334 0.558 1.041  0.391  0.646 0.122 
  (23.09)*** (8.25)***  (10.14)*** (21.66)*** (2.37)**  (34.75)*** (4.68)*** (3.02)*** (33.13)*** (0.34) 
                
Observations  65083 58013 65083 65083 58013 48009  42615  48009  48009  42615 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.05  0.05  0.09 0.15 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses, All regressions include  fixed  effects  and  clustered  errors         
     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 10: What is the Cause of the Bad Economic Situation (2003) 
  A  B C A+B+C  D  E  F  G 
  Globalization IMF WTO    Government 
Policies  Banks  Other 
Reasons 
Nobody 
ARG  13.11%  26.63%  5.09% 44.82% 65.61%  12.10% 52.08% 0.79% 
BOL 14.33%  20.25%  9.33%  43.92%  72.33%  7.50%  64.42%  1.18% 
BRA  13.33%  16.08%  9.83% 39.25% 65.42%  11.92% 55.25% 0.55% 
CHI  11.25%  5.58% 6.75% 23.58% 49.08%  9.50%  82.08% 3.66% 
COL  9.50%  11.50%  6.83% 27.83% 61.75%  10.67% 59.92% 2.44% 
CRI  15.14%  10.06% 11.45% 36.65%  68.53%  4.08%  43.33%  1.94% 
ECU  16.23%  26.80%  7.79% 50.82% 56.89%  20.66% 55.49% 0.66% 
ELS  20.14%  9.42% 6.65% 36.21% 63.49%  10.02% 45.44% 0.91% 
GTM  12.33%  6.76% 6.96% 26.04% 51.79%  9.94%  64.12% 0.77% 
HON  15.51%  21.77%  9.24% 46.52% 58.05%  24.25% 97.51% 0.98% 
MEX  16.92%  8.33% 8.17% 33.42% 68.92%  5.50%  53.58% 5.32% 
NIC  9.50%  12.28%  5.25% 27.03% 77.13%  10.30% 35.15% 1.17% 
PAN  27.99%  13.65% 17.23% 58.86%  59.26%  20.42%  76.89%  0.53% 
PER 9.67%  11.17%  5.00%  25.83%  70.42%  4.33%  52.67%  0.95% 
PRY  7.50%  7.50% 7.83% 22.83% 76.33%  14.17% 69.83% 0.00% 
URY  17.42%  23.67% 12.92% 54.00%  72.92%  21.08%  54.25%  1.72% 
VEN  6.92%  8.42% 6.33% 21.67% 46.42%  6.25%  51.75% 1.62% 
LAC  AVERAGE  13.93%  14.11%  8.39% 36.43% 63.78%  11.92% 59.63% 1.48% 
The numbers sum to more than 100 because some respondents gave multiple answers. 
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Figure 1. Support for Privatization



















Figure 2. Support for Market Economy 2000-2003
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Figure 6. Political Orientation 
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Figure 11. Attitude towards Reforms and 
























































Figure 12. Support for Reforms and Economic 
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Table 1A. Correlation Matrix 
 
  LACINT FDI  PRIVATIZMARKET  PRICES PRIVPROD IDENTPP  CONFIPP 
LACINT 1              
               
FDI 0.2116  1          
 (0.00)              
PRIVATIZ 0.0378  0.1386 1          
 (0.00)  (0.00)            
MARKET 0.0881 0.1515 0.2959  1        
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)          
PRICES 0.0621  0.0768  0.2267  0.3727  1      
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)        
PRIVPROD 0.0516  0.1342  0.3067  0.1868  0.2733  1    
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)      
IDENTPP 0.0228  N/A  0.0342 0.0641  N/A  N/A  1  
 (0.00)  -  (0.00)  (0.00)  -  -    
CONFIPP 0.0186  0.0036  0.1185 0.1437  0.0281 0.0398  0.2607 1 
 (0.00)  (0.66)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
   
    p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
 